Equity Issuance and Returns to Distressed Firms by Park, James L
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Summer 8-12-2011
Equity Issuance and Returns to Distressed Firms
James L. Park
Finance Department, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, james.park@sauder.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/372
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Park, James L., "Equity Issuance and Returns to Distressed Firms" (2011). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 372.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/372
Equity Issuance and Returns to Distressed Firms
Abstract
This dissertation documents the positive relationship between financial distress and equity issuance and
shows that dilution explains the low stock returns of distressed firms. When the cross-section of firms is sorted
by degree of distress, the value-weighted mean of the monthly net issuance rate increases significantly from
0.05% for the safest decile portfolio to 0.95% for the highest. Moreover, the low returns of distressed firms are
found only in past net issuers. The primary source of distressed equity issuances is discounted private
issuances. Unlike earlier empirical studies that focus on returns to existing shareholders, I find that firms that
issue equity privately do not underperform when returns of existing and new shareholders are combined. I
also show that many managers avoid shareholder approval when issuing discounted equity by keeping the
fraction of new shares just below the required 20% approval threshold. These findings suggest that dilution
explains the low returns of distressed firms.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Finance
First Advisor
Amir Yaron
Keywords
Distress Anomaly, Equity Issuance, SEO, PIPE, PlacementTracker, SDC Platinum
Subject Categories
Finance | Finance and Financial Management
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/372
EQUITY ISSUANCE AND RETURNS
TO DISTRESSED FIRMS
James L. Park
A DISSERTATION
in
Finance
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulllment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2011
Supervisor of Dissertation
Signature
Amir Yaron, Professor of Finance
Graduate Group Chairperson
Signature
Eric Bradlow, Professor of Marketing, Statistics, and Education
Dissertation Committee
Amir Yaron, Professor of Finance
João F. Gomes, Professor of Finance
A. Craig MacKinlay, Professor of Finance
Lucian A. Taylor, Assistant Professor of Finance
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Faculty, family members and friends have helped me to complete this disserta-
tion. I would like to express my gratitude to these individuals for their support and
assistance.
I would like to thank my advisors, João Gomes, Craig MacKinlay, Luke Taylor,
and Amir Yaron, for invaluable discussions and comments. I thank João Gomes for
mentoring me and helping me sort through research ideas. I thank Craig MacKinlay
for his encouragement and support for this dissertation. I thank Luke Taylor, who was
a great mentor who provided great advice at the perfect time. I would especially like
to thank my committee chair, Amir Yaron, for his continuous support and guidance
throughout the program.
I would also like to thank other members of the nance department at Wharton.
The faculty have provided me with a great graduate education. Their depth and wide
range of expertise have helped me develop broad research interests and think beyond
the obvious. My fellow PhD students, especially my cohort, have been great friends,
mentors, and colleagues.
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family and friends. My parents,
Tongkyu Park and Yongok Lee, have always been there for me. The encouragement
and support they provided were invaluable in helping me nish my dissertation. I
want to thank my brother, Christopher Park, who has been a friend and supporter
through my studies. I couldnt have nished without the support of my family. I
would also like to thank my friends, including my roommate Joonmahn Lee, who
have been true friends and family through my studies in Philadelphia.
ii
ABSTRACT
EQUITY ISSUANCE AND RETURNS
TO DISTRESSED FIRMS
James L. Park
Amir Yaron
This dissertation documents the positive relationship between nancial distress and
equity issuance and shows that dilution explains the low stock returns of distressed
rms. When the cross-section of rms is sorted by degree of distress, the value-
weighted mean of the monthly net issuance rate increases signicantly from 0.05%
for the safest decile portfolio to 0.95% for the highest. Moreover, the low returns of
distressed rms are found only in past net issuers. The primary source of distressed
equity issuances is discounted private issuances. Unlike earlier empirical studies that
focus on returns to existing shareholders, I nd that rms that issue equity privately
do not underperform when returns of existing and new shareholders are combined. I
also show that many managers avoid shareholder approval when issuing discounted
equity by keeping the fraction of new shares just below the required 20% approval
threshold. These ndings suggest that dilution explains the low returns of distressed
rms.
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1 Introduction
Studies have shown that nancial distress predicts low future stock returns.1 This
nding challenges the basic concept in nance that high non-diversiable risk is com-
pensated by high returns. This paper shows that distressed rms issue more equity
than non-distressed rms do, and that the low returns of distressed rms are found
only in rms that issue the most equity. Hence, to the extent that the distress anomaly
exists, it should be labeled the distressed issuance anomaly. More specically, dis-
tressed rms primarily issue shares to new investors privately and at a high discount,
which dilutes shareholder value. I also nd that managers avoid obtaining share-
holder approval when issuing discounted equity, which suggests a potential agency
problem for distressed rms. Issuing discounted equity transfers value from existing
to new shareholders, a process that is essential for understanding why distressed rms
perform poorly.
When the cross-section of rms is sorted by degree of distress, I nd that the value-
weighted mean of the monthly net issuance rate increases from 0.05% for the lowest
distress decile portfolio to 0.95% for the highest. Cross-sectional regressions conrm
this pattern and show that each 1% increase in 12-month-ahead failure probability
predicts a 1.17% increase in monthly equity issuance and a 1.34% decrease in monthly
stock return. The cross-sectional regressions also show that most variables included
in the distress measure are positively correlated with net equity issuance. To the best
1See Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) for details and Appendix A of this paper for repli-
cation.
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of my knowledge, this is the rst paper to document a robust positive correlation
between the degree of distress and net issuance.
As nancial distress and equity issuance are positively related, I investigate whether
the low returns of distressed rms and the low returns of high net issuance rms are
also related. The low return of net issuance rms has been studied in asset pricing
literature and is called the net issuance puzzle (see Fama and French (2008) and Pon-
ti¤ and Woodgate (2008) for more detail). By double-sorting stocks on distress and
net issuance, I nd that the distress anomaly (i.e., lower returns to distressed stocks)
exists only in the highest net issuance quintile. These results are robust to adjust-
ing returns using CAPM or the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. This relationship
suggests that the low equity returns of distressed rms are from distressed net equity
issuers.
I further investigate the source of distressed equity issuances by matching CRSP
with the SDC Platinum and PlacementTracker databases. The PlacementTracker
database provides rich private placement data that are not well represented in the
traditional SDC Platinum database. Accounting for private placements turns out
to be important for inferences regarding distress portfolio returns. By comparing
datasets, I nd that distressed equity issuance primarily occurs through private o¤er-
ings, rather than through public secondary equity o¤erings (SEOs). Frequencies of all
forms of private placements increase monotonically as rms become more distressed.
The private investment in public equity (PIPE) literature has documented the high
discounts and di¤erent forms of private issuances as well as the distressed nature of
issuers.2
2PIPEs are typically issued at a discount of over 30% to outside investors. See Chaplinsky and
Haushalter (2010) Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009), and Wu (2004).
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Since the low returns of distressed rms are concentrated in equity issuers that
issue privately, I next test whether the low returns of private issuers are due to value
transfer from existing shareholders to new investors (i.e., the value transfer hypothe-
sis). I calculate the one-year holding returns for shareholders after the issuance and
nd that existing shareholders earn negative abnormal returns of  4.21% (t-stat =
 2.91), while private new investors earn positive abnormal returns of 19.97% (t-stat =
8.98). Positive abnormal returns to private investors o¤set negative abnormal returns
to existing shareholders, making the total returns statistically insignicant ( 1.21%
[t-stat =  0.81]). These results suggest that the value transfer from existing share-
holders to new private investors drives the low returns of distressed issuers.
Next, I study whether existing shareholders approve of such dilutive measures.
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ require shareholder approval for discounted privately
issued equity that makes up more than 20% of the existing equity shares. Using the
distribution discontinuity at the 20% threshold, I observe that many managers avoid
shareholder approval by choosing an issuance fraction just below the 20% threshold.
Moreover, rms that avoid approval have negative one-year post-issue returns, while
shareholder-approved equity issuances have positive (but statistically insignicant)
returns. This suggests that many instances of discounted equity issuances are not in
the best interest of existing shareholders, supporting the hypothesis that distressed
rms perform poorly as a result of value transfer from existing shareholders to new
investors when public equity is sold privately.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, the paper documents a positive
relationship between distress and equity issuance, using broad cross-sectional data
on all publicly traded rms in CRSP. Other empirical studies generally use a small
sample of SEO observations and do not nd a strong association between equity
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o¤erings and distress.3 Theoretical corporate studies have argued that shareholders
would not want rms to issue equity when the rms are distressed (e.g., Myers (1977)
debt overhang problem and Jensen and Mecklings (1976) asset substitution problem).
Despite these studies, this paper nds a robust positive relationship between distress
and equity issuance. In the asset pricing literature, this positive relationship links the
distress anomaly with the net issuance puzzle, relabeling the anomaly as a distressed
issuance anomaly.
Second, this paper highlights a problem with the data commonly used to study
issuance, and suggests a solution. SDC Platinum is the primary data source after
1980 for equity issuance research (see Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007)). However, I
nd that SDC Platinums public database sample does not adequately represent the
population. I show that the SEO frequencies of SDC Platinum are hump-shaped in
the cross-section of distress; as distress level rises, equity issuances initially increase,
and then decrease. To achieve a comprehensive view of the equity issuance pattern
observed in CRSP, one must complement SEO data with adequate private issuance
data. Past literature has studied public and private issuance separately, making it
di¢cult to gauge their relative distribution. By looking at public and private issuance
together, this paper nds that equity o¤erings are positively correlated with distress,
primarily by private issuances that have not drawn as much research attention as
SEOs. SEOs seem to be the equity issuance tool of less distressed rms.
Third, this paper provides empirical evidence that distressed rms transfer value to
private investors by issuing discounted equity. Distressed rms have been the classical
3See Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) for the market timing motivation
of SEOs.
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setting for agency theory literature.4 However, it has been di¢cult to empirically
identify disagreement or value transfer among di¤erent agents. By showing that
distressed rms issue equity at a high discount to outside investors (and not to existing
shareholders through the form of rights o¤erings), this papers ndings suggest a new
channel of value transfer from existing to new shareholders.5 This value transfer also
suggests that agency cost might need to be considered in studying the returns of
distress portfolios.
Although my results show that value transfer can explain the low returns of dis-
tressed rms, several issues require further investigation. If the market is e¢cient,
dilution should be reected in prices as soon as the market is aware of the issuance.
Past issuance should not forecast future returns, as I nd in this paper. I do not
provide an explanation for why the low returns of equity issuers appear over a long
period of time after the issuance.6 Also, it is di¢cult to explain why existing share-
holders do not participate in discounted deals or, if issuance is predictable, why they
do not sell their shares before they are diluted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a review of related liter-
ature, Section 3 describes the distress measure and equity issuance data sets used for
analyses. Section 4 describes the equity issuance pattern in the cross-section of dis-
tress and the relationship between the distress anomaly and the net issuance puzzle.
Section 5 matches the equity issuance databases with the cross-sectional data and
shows that private issuances are the main source of distressed equity issuance. Sec-
4See Holmström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). Also, see Myers (2003) and Hotchkiss,
John, Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008) for a survey of papers and discussion.
5This channel is an addition to the well-known value transfer channel to creditors.
6I leave possible explanations, including underreaction, overcondence, or lag of information
dissemination, for future research.
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tion 6 provides empirical evidence supporting the value transfer hypothesis. Section 7
discusses unanswered questions, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The related literature spans both asset pricing literature on the distress anomaly
and the net issuance puzzle, and corporate nance literature of capital structure and
empirical equity issuance.
In asset pricing, the distress anomaly describes the negative relationship between
distress risk and average returns. Dichev (1998) rst documents this negative rela-
tionship using two accounting-based distress measures: Altmans (1968) Z-score and
Ohlsons (1980) O-score measures. Using these two measures, Gri¢n and Lemmon
(2002) determine that the lower returns are concentrated in growth-distressed rms.
Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) use the Merton (1974)
model type, distance-to-default measure to explore the relationship between distress
and equity returns.
More recently, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), document a clear negative
relationship between distress risk and stock returns. They apply a reduced form
model that includes market-adjusted and market-based variables, rather than using
only accounting variables. They include most of the other inputs used by other
accounting variable-based distress measures or distance-to-default measures.
While these papers focus on the explanatory power of the failure models and
document the low returns of distressed rms, my paper provides a new perspective
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by linking the anomaly with equity issuance.7
The increasing equity issuance pattern of distressed rms is interesting because
corporate nance literature does not agree on whether distressed rms should issue
equity. The pecking order theory posited by Myers and Majluf (1984) considers equity
issuance as nancing of last resort. On the other hand, agency theories suggest that
shareholders would not want the rm to issue equity when rms are distressed. Myers
(1977) suggests that because of value transfer to senior creditors, junior debt and
equity would be di¢cult to issue (i.e., the debt overhang problem). Additionally,
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that distressed equity holders prefer shifting risk
to creditors rather than issuing equity and diluting future payo¤s.
The empirical corporate nance literature is no more denitive about when rms
should issue equity. While some papers argue that equity issuance is nancing of last
resort, others draw di¤erent conclusions.8 Frank and Goyal (2003) and Fama and
French (2005) both use the broad cross-section of publicly traded rms, as I do in
this paper. These authors conclude that external equity is not a nancing vehicle of
last resort, because of the high frequencies of equity issuances and the order of nanc-
ing decisions. Moreover, Fama and French (2005) match the CRSP/Compustat equity
issuance with the SDC Platinum database to nd the source of equity issuance in the
cross-section, as I do. However, unlike these authors I do not directly test the pecking
order theory; rather, I test whether distressed rms issue more equity than less dis-
tressed rms. Additionally, I supplement SDC Platinum with private issuances from
7Chava and Purnanandam (2010), Gri¢n and Lemmon (2002), Avramov, Chordia, Jostova,
and Philipov (2007), George and Hwang (2010), and Garlappi and Yan (2011) explore di¤erent
characteristics and explanations for the low returns of distressed rms.
8See Fama and French (2005), Frank and Goyal (2003), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and
Lemmon and Zender (2002)
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PlacementTracker to provide a comprehensive view of the equity issuance population.
Gomes and Phillips (2005) study the choice of rms issuing publicly and privately.
Their dataset includes both SDC Platinum and PlacementTracker, and they nd that
asymmetric information plays a major role in the choice of issuance. Unlike them, I
include CRSP as my population database and only look at equity related issuance.
Comparing CRSP with SDC Platinum and PlacementTracker, I study how well public
and private issuances represent the CRSP equity issuance population. Also, I focus
on the cross-section of distress rather than the role of asymmetric information in the
choice of public and private issuance.
On the other hand, the leading empirical explanation for equity issuance is that
managers time the market and sell overpriced equity. This explanation is based
on the observation that there is a long-run underperformance after equity issuance.
These empirical papers generally use a small sample of equity issuance observations.
Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and A­eck-Graves (1995), and Baker andWurgler
(2002) present pre-issue overperformance and post-issue underperformance of rms,
which suggests market timing by managers. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen
(1995) document the overperformance of rms that repurchase equity (i.e., negative
net issuance). Ponti¤ and Woodgate (2008) and Fama and French (2008) apply the
results of equity issuances and repurchases in the broad cross-section and document
the net issuance puzzle in asset pricing literature. My research links the two anom-
alies, nding that the low returns of distressed rms are concentrated among high net
issuers.
More recently, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2009) explore di¤erent motiva-
tions for conducting SEOs. They nd that market timing and life cycle explanations
play an important role in the decision to issue equity. However, 62.6% of SEOs in
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their sample are distressed and would run out of cash by the following year. My pa-
per di¤ers from theirs in that by using CRSP, which encompasses all equity issuances
rather than only a smaller sample of SEOs, I nd that distress rms issue more eq-
uity than low-distress rms. While some distressed rms issue equity through public
o¤erings, I nd that distressed rms issue equity primarily through private markets.
My paper also uses a more sophisticated distress measure by Campbell, Hilscher, and
Szilagyi (2008) that includes various accounting and market variables as inputs.
My paper also contributes to the private placement literature. Several papers
have documented the distressed nature of rms that issue equity privately. Hertzel
and Smith (1993) argue that the discount in private placements is a solution to the
under-investment problem of distressed rms. Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010)
study the contracting terms of PIPEs and document di¤erent structures as well as
the distressed nature of each type of contract. The return pattern of privately issued
equity has also been studied. Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) document
the long-run underperformance of private equity issuance. Krishnamurthy, Spindt,
Subramaniam, and Woidtke (2005) nd that negative long-term abnormal returns are
converted to normal returns when private investors returns are aggregated, which
is consistent with the value transfer hypothesis. While these papers characterize
di¤erent aspects of privately issued equity, my paper documents the importance of
these private placements in the cross-section of distress.
Finally, my paper contributes to the agency problem literature in the area of dis-
tress and equity issuance. Using the example of L.A. Gear, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and
Wruck (2002) illustrate how asset liquidity can give managers substantial operating
discretion during nancial distress. Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) show that equity
issuances by rms with poor growth prospects reect agency problems and that stock
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prices react negatively to new equity issuances. Wu (2004), Barclay, Holderness, and
Sheehan (2007) and others suggest managerial entrenchment characteristics of private
placements looking at discounts, returns, and post-placement events. More recently,
Becker and Strömberg (2010) use a bankruptcy ruling change to examine equity-debt
conicts in nancial distress. They nd that the likelihood of equity issuance increases
when incentives to favor equity over debt become limited.
3 Data Sources and Distress Portfolio Formation
I use four data sources for this papers analysis. For stock market data, I use the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly and daily databases. I nd
market information and extract net issuances from the CRSP monthly database, and
use the CRSP daily database for event study analysis. For accounting data, I use
the Compustat (CRSP/Compustat Merged) quarterly database; I then use permno to
match rm observations with the CRSP database. The Compustat quarterly database
is used to construct portfolios based on the most recent accounting data and to
replicate Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) distress measure. SDC Platinum
and PlacementTracker datasets are used to match equity issuances observed in CRSP.
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3.1 Distress Measure and Portfolio Formation
The distress measure used in this paper is from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi
(2008).9 The measure (CHS) is the 12-month-ahead probability of nancial failure
estimated by a logit model. Failure is dened as delisting for performance-related
reasons, receiving a D rating from a rating agency, or ling Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.
The distress measure is:
CHS =  20:26NIMTAAV G+ 1:42TLMTA  7:13EXRETAV G+ 1:41SIGMA
 0:045RSIZE   2:13CASHMTA+ 0:075MB   0:058PRICE   9:16;(1)
where NIMTAAV G is a protability measure, TLMTA is a leverage measure,
EXRETAV G is the average past excess stock returns, SIGMA is the volatility
of the stock return, RSIZE is the size of the rm relative to the size of the market,
CASHMTA is a cash and short-term investment measure,MB is the market-to-book
ratio, and PRICE is the price of stock winsorized above $15. Denitions and detailed
derivations of each variable can be found in Appendix A and detailed characteristics
of distress portfolios can be found in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008).
Accounting variables are lagged for at least three months and market informa-
tion is lagged for one month to ensure there is su¢cient time for data to be publicly
available by the date of portfolio formation. I form distress portfolios following the
methodology of Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) as closely as possible. Port-
9The paper uses this distress measure for several reasons. First, the distress measure provides
a clear negative correlation between degree of distress and equity returns. Second, the explanatory
variables in the paper include most variables used in other distress measures. I show that most
variables included in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) contribute to the positive correlation
with net issuance. Therefore the results I nd using their measure would generally be found even if
I use other distress measures.
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folios are formed at the beginning of each year by sorting the cross-section of rms by
the distress measure (CHS) and are held for twelve months. I include portfolios from
1975 to 2008 to ensure there are at least 500 rms to form each portfolio (fty for each
decile portfolio, twenty for each 55 double-sorted portfolios and ten for each 510
double-sorted portfolios).10 Only common stocks that are traded on the NASDAQ,
NYSE, and AMEX exchanges are included in portfolios. Partial month returns and
delisting returns are used when available at delisting.11 Delisting bias corrections
of Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) are not used, following the
methodology of Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008).
3.2 Equity Issuance Data
This paper studies equity issuance distribution using three databases: CRSP, SDC
Platinum, and PlacementTracker. CRSP is used to identify issuances by increases of
shares outstanding. The SDC Platinum and PlacementTracker databases are used to
identify actual public and private issuance events.
CRSP net issuance is calculated using a methodology similar to that used to
calculate returns. Monthly returns excluding dividends (Rexi;t) of rm i at time t are
calculated by CRSP using stock split-adjusted price (Pi;t) and previous months split-
adjusted price (Pi;t 1).
12 To calculate the net issuance rate of a rm at time t, one
10This period is longer than the period used in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), who use
1981 to 2003. The distress anomaly is still present over this extended period. See Appendix A and
Table AI for replication of the distress anomaly.
11See CRSP (2001) for treatment of partial month returns and delisting returns in the CRSP
monthly database. Using the delisting bias correction does not a¤ect my results.
12To ensure that returns and price are available, I replace missing returns with zero and missing
price with the last observed price times returns. When a rm is delisted, I calculate the end-of-month
price by multiplying the last observed price and delisting returns.
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needs the market value at time t (Pi;tNi;t), the market value of equity at time t  1
(Pi;t 1 Ni;t 1), and the dividend-excluded returns (R
ex
i;t) at time t.
Issuei;t=
1
1+Rex
i;t
Pi;tNi;t
Pi;t 1Ni;t 1
  1 =
Pi;t 1Ni;t
Pi;t 1Ni;t 1
  1 =
Ni;t
Ni;t 1
  1 (2)
The value-weighted portfolio net issuance (IssueVWj;t ) can also be calculated by
summing the market value of each rm in the portfolio and calculating split-adjusted
net issuance using returns (Rexi;t).
IssueVWj;t =
P
1
1+Rex
i;t
Pi;tNi;tP
Pi;t 1Ni;t 1
  1 =
P
Pi;t 1Ni;tP
Pi;t 1Ni;t 1
  1 (3)
This method is again similar to the calculation for value-weighted portfolio stock
returns.
Net issuance for rms and portfolios is calculated each month using the monthly
CRSP database.13 The value-weighted monthly issuance rate is directly comparable
with value-weighted stock returns and can be accumulated quarterly or annually for
each rm or portfolio, as one would compound stock returns.
CRSP net issuance includes any transaction that increases shares outstanding,
including public o¤erings, private placements, grants, issuances to employees, warrant
exercise, and conversion of convertible features. Since CRSP includes all types of
issuances for all publicly traded stocks, it could be regarded as most representative
of the equity issuance population. However, CRSP does not provide details of the
source of share increases.
13CRSP does not necessarily observe the number of share increases each month. In most cases,
CRSP updates the number of shares at the end of each calendar quarter, so it is possible that the
equity issuance could lag up to one or two months from the actual equity issuance.
13
SDC Platinum and PlacementTracker databases, on the other hand, provide actual
equity issuances. The SDC Platinum database has been the primary data source for
both public and private equity issuance studies since the 1980s.14 PlacementTracker
provides many more private placement observations and includes detailed contract-
ing information, which is essential for identifying the source of equity issuance and
calculating the returns of private issuance investors. SDC Platinums public issuance
data along with PlacementTrackers private issuance data provide a better view of
the equity issuance population observed in CRSP.
To be included in the sample, rm observations from these two datasets must have
an assigned distress measure (CHS) at the beginning of each year and pass the screens
used in forming distress portfolios. Observations are matched with CRSP/Compustat
using the ticker symbol.15 Equity issuances take the form of common equity, convert-
ible preferred shares, or convertible bonds. If the same type of issuance appears in the
same month, I drop the subsequent observation to avoid counting multiple tranches
of the same issuance. For private placements, some of the issuances are structured.
Structured convertibles are downward protection features for investors formed by in-
creasing the number of converted equity shares when stock price decreases. Because of
the di¢culty of calculating investor returns and to be comparable to categorizations
of previous studies, I include only convertible resets and variable rate convertibles as
structured issuances.16
14See Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) for a survey of papers and a detailed description of data.
15Using ticker symbols matches 25% more observations than when using cusips. All matches using
cusips are also matched with the ticker symbol.
16See Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010) for di¤erent contracting terms of PIPEs. I drop struc-
tured equity lines, common equity resets, variable priced prepaid warrants, and self-amortizing
convertibles. Dropped observations are less than 5% of the total PlacementTracker sample and are
distributed cross-sectionally in a similar way as other convertibles.
14
Table I: Summary of Equity Issuance Databases
The table presents the number of SDC Platinum and PlacementTracker observations that are in-
cluded in distress portfolios at the beginning of each year. The SDC Platinum database spans the
period between 1975 and 2008, while the PlacementTracker database starts in 1995. SDC Platinum
is divided into public and private issuances, while PlacementTracker contains only private issuances.
The table also presents the proportion of total issuances with warrants attached and the proportion
of convertibles that are structured for PlacementTracker.
Database Category 1975-2008 1995-2008
Public Issuance
Common Equity 10,008 6,363
Convertible Preferred 343 107
Convertible Debt 993 273
Rights O¤erings 81 34
SDC Platinum Public Total 11,425 6,777
Private Issuance
Common Equity 1,299 1,093
Convertible Preferred 352 276
Convertible Debt 1,209 1,083
Private Total 2,860 2,452
Private Issuance
Common Equity 2,851
Convertible Preferred 1,202
PlacementTracker Convertible Debt 1,633
PIPE Total 5,686
% with Warrants Attached 38.2%
% of Convertibles Structured 28.4%
15
Table I summarizes the number of observations from each database. SDC Plat-
inum includes a total of 11,425 public observations, of which the majority (10,008) are
common equity issuances. Convertible preferred shares and debt observations consist
of 343 and 993 observations, respectively. During this period, 81 rights o¤erings were
observed. During the subperiod from 1995 to 2008, 64% of the full sample period
common equity issuances were made. Less than 30% of other types of public issuance
are included in this subperiod. Most of the private issuance observations (2,452 out of
2,860) were observed after 1995. PlacementTracker has 5,686 observations, of which
50.1% are common equity issuances. Convertible issuances comprise the other half.
Using PlacementTrackers database, I nd that 38.2% of the issuances have warrants
attached to them, while 28.4% of the convertibles were structured convertibles.
Overall, the combined dataset is larger than those used by most issuance studies.
The combined dataset encompasses both public and private issuances, providing a
better view of the issuance population.
4 Issuance and Returns in the Cross-section of
Distress
4.1 Equity Issuance in Distress Portfolios
To study whether equity issuance could help explain the low returns of distressed
rms, I rst document the positive relationship between degree of distress and eq-
uity issuance using distress-sorted portfolios and size-adjusted portfolios. I nd the
relationship to be robust over di¤erent subperiods, and negatively correlated to the
16
equity return patterns of distress-sorted portfolios.
Table II reports mean monthly issuance rates for the period between 1975 and
2008. The ten distress decile portfolios are labeled 1 for the 0 to 10 percentile, 2
for the 10 to 20 percentile, 3 for the 20 to 30 percentile, and so on up to 10. Each
portfolio corresponds to one column of the table. The last two columns are long-
short portfolios measuring monthly mean di¤erence of issuance. The notation 10-1
represents the equity issuance di¤erence between the highest-distress decile portfolio
and the lowest-distress decile portfolio, and 9, 10-1, 2 represents the mean di¤erence
between the highest-distress portfolio (9 and 10) and lowest-distress portfolio (1 and
2) when quintile portfolios are formed instead of decile portfolios. The t-statistics for
the null hypothesis that the issuance values equal zero are in parentheses.
First, I study single-sorted distress decile portfolios. In Panel A, we observe that
the net monthly equity issuance rate increases signicantly and almost monotonically,
from 0.05% for the lowest-distress decile portfolio to 0.95% for the highest-distress
decile portfolio. The monotonic increasing pattern becomes clear after the median.
Although not reported in the table, splitting the highest decile portfolio into 90 to 95,
95 to 99, and 99 to 100 percentile portfolios yields monthly equity issuances of 0.77%,
1.16%, and 2.05%, respectively. The further splitting conrms that the increasing
issuance pattern is stable even for the most distressed rms. The long-short portfolio
in the last two columns report a mean equity issuance di¤erence of 0.90% (t-stat =
11.63) for the decile long-short portfolio and 0.62% (t-stat = 13.23) for the quintile
long-short portfolio. The mean di¤erences are both statistically signicant from zero.
The clear increasing pattern in conjunction with the mean di¤erence test conrms
that equity issuance increases as the distress level rises.
Next, I study size-adjusted distress decile portfolios. Campbell, Hilscher, and
17
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Szilagyi (2008) reports that distressed rms are smaller than low-distress stocks. It
may be possible that distressed rms issue equity in larger fractions because they are
smaller, not necessarily because they are distressed. To further address this issue,
I investigate the equity issuance pattern by looking at distress-sorted portfolios of
di¤erent size. I rst sort all rms into quintile-size bins using the market size when
portfolios are formed (labeled Small, 2, 3, 4, Big in Panel B of Table II).
Within each of the ve bins, I form ten distress decile portfolios. Size-adjusted
represents the mean equally weighted average of the ve quintiles of issuance rates
for each distress portfolio.
For each of the ve size portfolios, the increasing trend in distress equity issuance
is pervasive. The smallest quintile of the lowest-distress decile portfolio averages
an equity issuance of 0.29%, compared to the largest quintile lowest-distress decile
portfolio of 0.05%. The stocks in the smallest quintile increase from 0.29% for the
lowest-distress portfolio to 1.71% for the highest-distress portfolio. The increasing
pattern for the largest quintile increases from 0.05% for the lowest-distress portfolio
to 0.28% for the highest-distress portfolio. The tests of mean di¤erence in distressed
rms and the low-distress rms are statistically signicant for decile (10-1) and quin-
tile portfolios (9, 10-1, 2) for all of the ve size quintiles. In general, smaller rms
issue more equity.
The size-adjusted equity issuances in the last row exhibit an equity issuance pat-
tern that almost monotonically increases following the degree of distress. The size-
adjusted pattern is close to that of the single-sorted distress portfolios in the rst row.
The non-monotonicity in the single-sort disappears in the size-adjusted single-sort.
The portfolios in the highest-distress decile portfolio exhibit 0.93% monthly issuance
for the size-adjusted portfolio sorts. The mean di¤erences in equity issues for high
19
minus low distress portfolios are both statistically signicant, at the 1% level, with
di¤erences of 0.52% (t-stat = 12.76) and 0.71% (t-stat = 13.02) for the decile and
quintile portfolios, respectively. These patterns show that the increasing equity is-
suance pattern is not a mere result of the size of distressed rms, but robust over
di¤erent size portfolios.
Finally, the increasing equity issuance pattern and decreasing return pattern (i.e.,
distress anomaly) in distress-sorted portfolios are summarized in Figure 1. The solid
line represents value-weighted equity issuance rate for each distress portfolio and the
dashed line represents the value-weighted stock returns. The data are presented for
the entire period, as well as for subperiods of 1975 to 1994 and 1995 to 2008, in
Panels A, B, and C. Both the increasing stock return pattern and the decreasing
equity issuance pattern are robust in both subperiods but are more pronounced in
the second subperiod. For each panel, the left gure presents single-sorted portfolios
and the right panel presents size-adjusted portfolios. Returns are size-adjusted in
the same way that equity issuances are adjusted. When the left and right gures are
compared, we can see that the decreasing stock return pattern is more pronounced for
size-adjusted distress portfolios. This is because equally weighted returns of portfolios
in di¤erently sized quintiles overweight small stock compared to their actual value-
weight to the market.
Overall, the slope in mean equity issuance is steeper for high-distress rms than
low-distress rms. This pattern is also similar to the decrease in returns for high-
distress portfolios. The mean di¤erences of equity issuance are statistically signi-
cantly positive at the 1% level for both single and size-adjusted sorts for all subperiods.
From Figure 1, we see that average returns across deciles are negatively related to
issuance, and decrease in similar magnitudes as the increase in equity issuance. This
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provides an initial clue that issuance might be driving the low returns of distressed
rms.
As a robustness check, I form distress decile portfolios using distress measures of
Altmans (1968) Z-score, Ohlsons (1980) O-score, and Vassalou and Xings (2004)
EDF measure. I nd an increasing equity issuance pattern for distressed rms for
all the measures. The mean di¤erence tests for all 10-1 and 9, 10-1, 2 portfolios are
statistically signicant.
4.2 Cross-sectional Regressions of Equity issuance and Re-
turns
I use cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to further quantify and
formalize the correlation between distress, equity issuances, and stock returns. The
Fama-MacBeth regression cross-checks the value-weighted portfolio pattern in equal-
weighted rm month observations. Moreover, the cross-sectional regression allows
multiple slope coe¢cients to identify which explanatory variable of CHS contributes
to the positive relationship between distress and equity issuance.
I run monthly regressions of net issuance and stock returns on characteristics and
a constant for the period from 1975 to 2008:
yi;t=t+BtXi;t + ei;t; (4)
where
yi;t =
8>><
>>:
Issuei;t for regression (1), (2), (3) and (4)
Ri;t for regression (5), (6), (7) and (8)
9>>=
>>; (5)
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Firmmonth observations are limited to those rms that are included in distress portfo-
lios in previous sections; a total of 1,412,923 rm month observations over 408 months
(from 1975 to 2008) are analyzed. I average the individual coe¢cients over time and
use Fama-MacBeth standard errors to control for cross-sectional correlation.17
Cross-sectional regressions are used to predict monthly equity issuance and stock
returns given a distress measure and other characteristic variables from the beginning
of the year. I use both CHS and its logistic transformation as the distress measure.
Since CHS is the estimation from a logit regression, the logistic transformation gives
a 12-month-ahead probability interpretation for the measure.
Failure P^i;t =
1
1 + exp( CHSi;t)
(6)
In a separate specication, I use all the explanatory variables used to form the
distress measure of CHS to see which variables drive the results. The explanatory vari-
ables included in CHS are winsorized above and below the 5% level as in Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). The winsorized variables are ideal for cross-sectional
regression, as there is a potential issue of small number of inuential observations
a¤ecting the overall results in a Fama-MacBeth regression.
Finally, I include average monthly past net issuance with CHS to see how past
issuance predicts issuance and returns. I measure past net issuance at a one-year
horizon, similar to Ponti¤ and Woodgate (2008) and Fama and French (2008). I
average monthly net issuance from the end of September of year t-2 to the end of
September of year t-1 and use as a past net issuance regressor to predict net issuance
in year t.
17Using Newey-West standard errors yields similar inferences.
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Xi;t=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Failure P^i;t 1 for regression (1) and (5)
CHSi;t 1 for regression (2) and (6)
All explanatory
variables of CHSi;t 1
for regression (3) and (7)
CHSi;t 1 and Net Issuancei;t 1 for regression (4) and (8)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(7)
Table III presents the coe¢cients of the cross-sectional regression. Panel A presents
the regression results for predicting net issuance, and Panel B presents the results for
predicting stock returns.
First, I quantify how the degree of distress predicts net issuance and returns using
Failure P^ and CHS. Regressions (1) and (5) regress on failure probability (P^ ) and
have coe¢cients of 1.17 (t-stat = 13.85) for predicting net issuance and  1.34 (t-stat
=  2.66) for predicting stock returns. The marginal e¤ect can be interpreted as the
following: each 1% increase in one-year failure probability predicts a 1.17% increase in
monthly net issuance and a 1.34% decrease in stock return. The absolute magnitude
of the coe¢cients is close, conrming the portfolio pattern observed in Figure 1.
Regressions (2) and (6) predict net issuance and stock returns using the distress
measure CHS. The distress measure predicts net issuance positively with a coe¢cient
of 0.24% (t-stat = 13.85) and predicts stock returns negatively with a coe¢cient
of  0.23% (t-stat =  2.17). Both the logistic transformation of failure probability
and CHS predict issuance and stock returns with similar quantities but in opposite
directions, conrming results in regressions (1) and (5) and the pattern observed from
portfolio analysis.
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Next, I investigate how the explanatory variables that comprise CHS contribute
to the positive correlation with future net issuance and negative correlation with
returns. The positive and negative signs presented before the regressors are stated in
the direction that they contribute to CHS.
Regression (3) uses all explanatory variables as regressors in the cross-sectional
regression to predict net issuance. With the exception of the price of the stock
winsorized above $15 (PRICE), all explanatory variables are statistically signicant
at the 1% level. Among the statistically signicant variables, all variables except
past return (EXRETAVG) predict net issuance in the same direction that they pre-
dict failure.18 Higher net income (NIMTAAVG), leverage (TLMTA), stock volatility
(SIGMA), smaller rms (RSIZE), lower market-to-book (MB) ratio, and cash and
short-term investment (CASHMTA) predict higher net issuance and predict probabil-
ity of failure. This shows that most of the variables included in the distress measure
contribute to the positive correlation between the degree of distress and equity is-
suance.
Many explanatory variables of CHS and their strong statistical signicance also
help suggest similar positive correlation between distress and net issuance when using
di¤erent distress measures. The distance-to-default measure based on the Merton
model uses the combination of stock volatility and leverage to predict default.19 The
hazard model by Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) includes ve variables
18The positive sign of EXRETAVG is consistent with the market timing hypothesis, which predicts
that managers issue when equity is overpriced. Since EXRETAVG predicts distress negatively, the
distress motivation is separated from the market timing motivation of issuing equity. The positive
sign suggests that market timing motivates issuance on average, but is not the main motivation for
distressed issuances.
19Bharath and Shumway (2008) compares di¤erent procedures to construct asset volatility and
leverage.
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(past return, stock return volatility, market cap, protability, and leverage) that are
closely related to the variables of CHS and thus would achieve similar results. Other
accounting distress measures, such as Altmans (1968) Z-score and Ohlsons (1980)
O-score, include some variation of leverage, book-to-market, protability, size (total
assets), and cash and short-term investment. All inputs in di¤erent distress measures
(except for past returns) that predict higher distress would also predict higher net
issuance.
Regression (7) reports the coe¢cients of the explanatory variables predicting fu-
ture stock return. These results are comparable with those in Table X of Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). The protability measure (NIMTAAVG), volatility of
the stock return (SIGMA), cash and short-term investment measure (CASHMTA),
and market-to-book ratio (MB) predict net issuance and stock returns in opposite
directions. Many of the explanatory variables that predict distress also predict lower
returns, and even more variables predict higher equity issuance. The cross-sectional
regressions conrm that most variables included in the distress measure contribute
to the increasing equity issuance pattern as well as to the decreasing return pattern
observed in distress-sorted portfolios.
Finally, I investigate how past net issuance and distress predicts future issuance
and stock returns. The predictability of past net issuance has been documented
by Ponti¤ and Woodgate (2008) and Fama and French (2008). I include past net
issuance in regression (4) and (8) with CHS. Regression (4) shows that past net
issuance predicts net issuance positively (0.78 [t-stat = 14.72]), while the coe¢cient
of CHS does not change much from regression (2). Regression (8) shows that past net
issuance predicts lower stock returns with a coe¢cient of  0.18 (t-stat =  7.88). The
prediction of low returns by high net issuers is known as the net issuance puzzle. When
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compared to regression (6), the coe¢cient of CHS loses its statistical signicance at
the 5% level. The decrease of the coe¢cient  0.23 (t-stat =  2.17) to  0.20 (t-stat
=  1.93) is small. However, this implies that the distress anomaly and net issuance
puzzle could be related, and requires further investigation.
One problem with using cross-sectional regressions for net issuance is that many
rms do not issue most of the time. This could lead to non-normal distribution of
mean net issuance, and Fama-MacBeth standard errors might be the wrong standard
errors to use. To address this problem, I plot the distribution of monthly and quarterly
mean net issuances by distress quintile portfolios.
Figure 2 presents the histograms of mean monthly issuances and mean quarterly
issuances. We can observe that mean issuances are not normally distributed, with
many observations being close to zero with a right-skewed distribution. We can ob-
serve that the distribution of issuances in high-distress quintile bins have longer right
tails, leading to higher mean net issuance. Using bootstrapping standard errors with
a sample size of 2,000, I nd the di¤erence of the highest-distress quintile portfolio
and lowest distress quintile portfolio to be statistically signicant at the 1% level
for the mean monthly and quarterly issuances as well as the pooled sample. This
conrms the positive relationship between distress and equity issuance.
4.3 Distress and Net Issuance Double-sorted Portfolios
I further study how the low returns of distress rms and the low returns of high net
issuance are related using double-sorted portfolios. The cross-section of rms is sorted
into equal quintiles of net issuance bins at the beginning of each year, where past net
issuance is measured as in the previous section. Within each net issuance quintile, I
form quintiles of distress bins, forming 25 portfolios.
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Table IV: Distress E¤ect over Net Issuance Quintiles
The table presents monthly value-weighted stock returns on net issuance and distress double-sorted
portfolios from 1975 to 2008 in percentages. Firms are rst sorted by the beginning of the year into
net issuance quintiles, where net issuance is measured from September of year t-2 to September of t-1.
Within each net issuance quintile, rms are sorted into distress quintiles, where the distress measure
is from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). Panel A presents the mean value-weighted excess
monthly returns, and Panel B presents the risk-adjusted returns of long highest-distress quintile
portfolio (H) and short lowest-distress quintile portfolio (L) within each net issuance quintile. Excess
returns are adjusted by CAPM, the Fama and French 3-factor model, and the Carhart 4-factor model.
All factors are from Ken Frenchs website.
Net Issuance
Portfolios Low 2 3 4 High
Distress Panel A. Monthly VW Excess Returns
Low 0.68 0.51 0.82 0.70 0.34
2 0.65 0.36 0.60 0.50 0.43
3 0.87 0.38 0.66 0.67 0.02
4 0.87 0.82 0.77 0.41 -0.09
High 0.82 0.32 0.65 0.39 -0.80
H-L 0.14 -0.19 -0.18 -0.31 -1.13**
(0.47) (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.94) (-3.17)
Panel B. Risk-adjusted Returns
CAPM  -0.11 -0.53 -0.44 -0.58 -1.42**
(-0.40) (-1.52) (-1.36) (-1.86) (-4.18)
3-factor  -0.57* -0.83** -0.82** -0.94** -1.79**
(-2.36) (-2.58) (-2.81) (-3.17) (-5.83)
4-factor  -0.22 -0.52 -0.39 -0.44 -1.22**
(-0.95) (-1.60) (-1.38) (-1.55) (-4.23)
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Table IV reports the mean value-weighted excess returns in percentages. The ve
columns represent the net issuance quintiles from low to high. Panel A reports the
mean excess value-weighted stock returns for the 25 portfolios and the distress long-
short quintile portfolio returns excess of the risk-free rate. For low equity issuers, the
stock return pattern does not decrease. In the low net issue bin, low-distress rms
have monthly excess returns of 0.68%, while high-distress rms have monthly excess
returns of 0.82%. The high-distress portfolio has a higher mean value-weighted return
than the low-distress portfolio does. For net issuance portfolios 2 and 3, the returns
do not have a clear decreasing return pattern following the distress sort.
The decreasing pattern becomes more distinct in higher net issuance portfolios.
There seems to be a clear drop of returns in the highest net issuance, highest-distress
portfolio with -0.80% monthly excess returns. The high minus low distress quintile
long-short hedge portfolio spread summarizes these results. The spread is positive
(0.14% [t-stat = 0.47]) for the lowest net issuance quintile bin and decreases to a sta-
tistically signicant ( 1.13% [t-stat =  3.17]) monthly excess return for the highest
net issuance quintile portfolio.
Panel B presents the risk-adjusted returns for the high minus low distress quintile
excess returns. CAPM alphas are all negative due to higher loadings of distress stocks
compared to low-distress stocks. However, all but the highest issuance quintile distress
spreads remain statistically insignicant at the 1% level. When returns are adjusted
by the Fama and French 3-factors, all alphas become statistically signicant; this
signicance is due to the fact that high-distress stocks have higher loadings on both
HML and SMB factors without having higher returns to match the loadings. The
last row presents the Carhart 4-factor model, including momentum to the Fama and
French 3 factors. The 4-factor model reduces the magnitude of the alpha by about
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half, and reduces the statistically signicant pattern of returns to that of the mean
excess returns and CAPM alpha pattern.20 Only the highest net issuance portfolio
has a statistically signicant alpha ( 1.22% [t-stat =  4.23]).
The net issuance puzzle and momentum are documented as anomalies pervasive
in all sizes by Fama and French (2008). The distress anomaly is clearly correlated
with the well-documented net issuance puzzle and momentum. The stronger momen-
tum e¤ect in lower credit rating rms has been documented by Avramov, Chordia,
Jostova, and Philipov (2007). Although past low returns predict higher failure prob-
ability, I leave the relationship between distress and momentum for future research,
as this paper concentrates on explaining the relationship between distress and equity
issuance. As the CHS measure includes size (RSIZE), book-to-market (MB), and
past returns (EXRETAVG), it is not surprising that the Fama and French 3-factors
and momentum play a role in the distress portfolios.
More surprising is the relationship between distress and net issuance, because
issuance is not directly included as one of the explanatory variables of CHS and is not
mentioned by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). The low returns of distressed
rms are concentrated in the intersection of the two puzzles, which provides insight
into both anomalies. This relationship implies that as a trading strategy, not all
distressed rms, but the distressed net issuers should be shorted to take advantage
of this anomaly. This is the rst paper to establish this link, as previous studies have
not generally associated equity issuance with distress.
To check robustness, I look at di¤erent specications for the distress e¤ect over
di¤erent net issuance quintiles. Table V presents the excess returns and CAPM-
20See Table AI and Table AII for factor loading patterns on distress-sorted portfolios, and Ap-
pendix A for discussions on momentum.
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Table V: Other Specications for Distress E¤ect over Net Issuance Quintiles
The table presents monthly excess returns and CAPM-adjusted returns of long highest-distress quin-
tile portfolio (H) and short lowest-distress quintile portfolio (L) within each net issuance quintile.
Panels A and B are long-short returns from distress rms conditionally sorted on net issuance portfo-
lios. Firms are rst sorted by the beginning of the year into net issuance quintiles, where net issuance
is measured from September of year t-2 to September of t-1. Within each net issuance quintile, rms
are sorted into distress quintiles, where the distress measure is from Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi
(2008). Panel A looks at equal-weighted portfolio returns. Panel B looks at value-weighted portfolio
returns for two subperiods of 1975 to 1995 and 1995 to 2008. In Panel C, rms are sorted into
distress quintile portfolios unconditionally of their net issuance quintiles. Both equal-weighted and
value-weighted portfolio returns are presented.
Net Issuance
Portfolios Low 2 3 4 High
Distress Panel A. EW Returns
H-L -0.25 -0.14 -0.26 -0.36 -1.13**
(-1.10) (-0.52) (-0.96) (-1.22) (-3.56)
CAPM  -0.38 -0.34 -0.44 -0.54 -1.27**
(-1.76) (-1.31) (-1.70) (-1.91) (-4.04*)
Panel B. Subperiod VW Returns
Subperiod (1975-1994)
H-L 0.32 0.05 0.04 -0.32 -0.79*
(0.84) (0.13) (0.12) (-0.88) (-2.21)
CAPM  0.03 -0.18 -0.17 -0.55 -0.97**
(-0.07) (-0.47) (-0.49) (-1.56) (-2.78)
Subperiod (1995-2008)
H-L -0.18 -0.62 -0.43 -0.30 -1.63*
(-0.40) (-0.87) (-0.65) (-0.79) (-2.31)
CAPM  -0.36 -0.97 -0.69 -0.55 -1.94**
(-0.82) (-1.56) (-1.13) (-0.99) (-3.04)
Panel C. Unconditionally Sorted Returns
VW Returns
H-L -0.13 -0.01 -0.24 -0.40 -0.93**
(-0.35) (-0.04) (-0.69) (-1.10) (-2.66)
CAPM  -0.44 -0.36 -0.55 -0.75* -1.18**
(-1.23) (-1.09) (-1.67) (-2.18) (-3.54)
EW Returns
H-L -0.30 -0.14 -0.27 -0.39 -1.11**
(-1.15) (-0.55) (-0.99) (-1.26) (-3.70)
CAPM  -0.46 -0.35 -0.45 -0.60* -1.25**
(-1.80) (-1.41) (-1.71) (-2.02) (-4.20)
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adjusted returns of long highest-distress quintile portfolios (H) and short lowest-
distress quintile portfolios (L).21 Panel A presents equal-weighted portfolio returns,
and Panel B presents subperiod value-weighted returns. Panel C presents both value-
weighted and equal-weighted returns for distressed rms unconditionally sorted on net
issuance quintiles. All specications yield similar return patterns to those observed in
Table IV. The distress anomaly is most distinct in the highest net issuance portfolio.
5 The Source of Distressed Equity Issuance
Empirical SEO studies do not nd a strong relationship between equity o¤erings and
the degree of distress.22 Private placement literature, on the other hand, nds that
issuers are distressed. However, past literature has studied public and private issuance
separately, making it di¢cult to gauge their relative distribution in the cross-section
of distress. This section investigates the main source of distressed equity issuance by
looking at public and private issuance together.
5.1 CRSP Equity Issuance
To investigate how distressed rms issue equity, I rst revisit the CRSP database
to examine the cross-sectional distribution of issuances. I convert the CRSP value-
weighted mean of net issuances to a frequency distribution to be comparable with
SDC Platinum and PlacementTracker observations. At the beginning of each year,
I form equally sized decile bins and identify equity issuance if the number of shares
21Fama and French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor models yields quantitatively similar results as
Table IV.
22See Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) for a survey of papers.
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outstanding increases by more than 3% quarterly for a given rm.23
Table VI presents the frequencies of net issuance observations for each distress
decile bin. Each column is labeled in the same way as in Table II. Panel A.1 re-
ports the equity issuance pattern. The total number of equity issuance observations
increases monotonically from 2,540 observations for the lowest-distress decile bin to
6,205 observations for the highest-distress bin. Moreover, equity issuances compose
a larger fraction of existing shares for rms in higher degree of distress. The pro-
portion of equity issuances in the 3% to 10% range decreases from 56.3% for the
lowest-distress decile bin to 43% for the highest-distress decile, while the fraction of
equity issuance larger than 20% of the existing shares increases from 20.1% to 33.3%
in the distress-sorted bins. This distribution shows that distressed rms not only issue
equity more frequently than other rms, but also issue equity in larger fractions.
Panel A.2 presents the distribution of repurchases. Repurchase frequencies are
reported because they decrease the net issuance rate. Repurchases are identied if
the number of shares outstanding decreases more than 3% quarterly for a given rm.
The repurchase distribution exhibits a decreasing pattern, from 1,945 observations in
the lowest-distress decile bin down to 746 observations in the highest-distress decile
bin. Because repurchases decrease net issuance, the decreasing repurchase pattern
23The 3% cut-o¤ point I use to identify equity issuances and repurchases is somewhat arbitrary.
However, it is di¢cult to increase shares by more than 3% without issuing equity publicly or privately.
Choosing a lower cut-o¤ point would include observations with share change as a result of employee
stock options or other minor adjustments. These smaller issuances are not the focus of this paper
because the low returns of distressed rms are concentrated in the highest net issuance quintile bin.
I use quarterly cumulated net issuance data points because CRSP does not necessarily observe
shares every month; equity issuance observations sometimes appear one to two months later. Because
I use a longer horizon, the total number of observations decreases for both issuances and repurchases.
The decline is due to both the aggregation of multiple issuances and repurchases during the period,
as well as o¤setting transactions.
The main pattern for both repurchases and issuances in the cross-section is robust to smaller or
larger cut-o¤ thresholds and for di¤erent horizons.
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contributes to the increasing net issuance pattern.
Panel B analyzes the subperiods of 1975 to 1994 and 1995 to 2008. The numbers
of repurchases and issuance comprise approximately half the observations in the full
sample for each subperiod. Although the pattern is stronger in the second subperiod
as observed in Figure 1, the increasing pattern for equity issuances and decreasing
pattern for repurchases can be observed in both subperiods.
Overall, both the increasing equity issuance pattern and the decreasing repurchase
pattern contribute to the increasing net issuance pattern observed in the cross-section
of distress. These observations in CRSP data are most comprehensive in nding share
increases of all traded rms.24 However, it is di¢cult to specify the source of the
increasing shares using only CRSP.
5.2 SDC Platinum, PlacementTracker and Equity Issuance
To further investigate the source of distressed equity issuance, I compare SDC Plat-
inum and PlacementTracker databases to the CRSP database equity issuances. The
distribution of SDC Platinum and PlacementTracker issuances will be studied before
being compared together with the CRSP equity issuances.
First, SDC Platinum observations are divided into public and private issuances.
Within each category, I subdivide equity issuance by common equity, convertible
preferred shares, and convertible debt. For public issuances, I include rights o¤erings,
which are short-lived, in-the-money warrants distributed to existing shareholders.
24I conrm that mean average issuance increases for distressed rms using the quarterly Compustat
database. I use cash ows from sale and repurchase of common and preferred stock and adjusted
for sale and repurchases of preferred stock. Finally, I divide net issuance of common stock by total
market value to calculate the net issuance rate. I nd that net issuance is positively correlated with
distress.
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Table VII reports the distribution of cross-sectional observations of SDC Platinum
data. Panel A rst presents the public issuance distribution for distress-sorted bins in
the full period from 1975 to 2008. All public issuances of common equity, convertible
preferred shares, and convertible debt exhibit a hump-shaped pattern throughout the
degree of distress. Common equity issuances increase from 804 observations in the
lowest-distress bin to 1,231 observations in the 5th decile bin, and decrease to 723
observations for the highest-distress bin. Convertible preferred shares increase from
11 in the lowest-distress bin to 44 in the 5th decile bin, and decrease to 17 in the
highest-distress decile bin. Convertible debt increases from 91 in the lowest-distress
decile bin to 137 in the 5th decile bin, and decreases to 25 in the highest-distress
decile bin. These hump-shaped patterns observed for public equity issuances do not
match the increasing pattern of equity issuance observed in CRSP.
The rights o¤erings, however, signicantly increase from 2 observations for the
lowest-distress bin to 24 in the highest-distress bin. Assuming that shareholders know
the true value of the rm, rights o¤erings should be a popular method of nancing
for undervalued distressed rms, overcoming the asymmetric information problem of
public issuances. Outside of the nance industry, however, rights o¤erings have not
been as popular in the U.S. as they have been in Europe or Asia.25 The nancial rms
are not included in this papers sample. Although the increasing pattern of rights
o¤ering matches the CRSP equity issuance pattern, the number of observations is not
su¢cient to explain the distressed equity issuance pattern.
The bottom four rows of Panel A present the frequencies of private issuances in
the cross-section of distress. Both common equity and convertible preferred shares in-
25Smith (1977) describes the cost advantage of pure rights o¤erings, and Smith (1977) and Eckbo
(2008) describe the disappearing rights o¤ering phenomenon in the U.S. after the late 1970s.
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crease following the sorting of distress bins. Common equity issuances monotonically
increase from 32 in the lowest-distress decile bin to 283 in the highest-distress decile
bin. Convertible preferred shares signicantly increase from 3 in the lowest-distress
decile to 92 in the highest-distress decile bin. Convertible debt issuances, however,
have a hump-shaped pattern over distress bins (119 in the lowest-distress decile bin
and 132 in the 5th decile bin, and 109 in the highest-distress decile bin). In total,
private issuance exhibits a monotonically increasing issuance pattern that matches
the pattern from CRSP, but the number of observations is relatively small compared
to the number of public o¤erings.
Panel B presents the SDC Platinum distribution of public and private issuances
for two subperiods. The rst two rows present the cross-sectional distributions for
the rst subperiod from 1975 to 1994. The public equity issuances are again hump-
shaped, increasing from 393 in the lowest-distress decile bin to 652 in the 5th decile
bin, and decreasing to 138 in the highest-distress bin. The number of private equity
issuance observations for this period is much less than in the second subperiod. The
pattern is hump-shaped, increasing from 28 in the lowest-distress bin to 45 in the
5th decile bin, and decreasing to 33 in the highest-distress bin. The bottom two
rows of Panel B show the cross-sectional distribution for the second subperiod from
1995 to 2008. The public equity issuance is still hump-shaped, increasing from 393
observations in the lowest-distress decile bin to 768 observations in the 5th decile bin,
and decreasing to 651 observations in the highest-distress decile bin. Private issuances
increase monotonically from 126 in the lowest-distress decile bin to 451 observations
for the highest-distress bin.
Overall, SDC Platinums cross-sectional distribution data show that public equity
issuance does not represent the increasing distressed issuance pattern. Its private
40
issuance observations increase as rms are more distressed. But the number of obser-
vations is not su¢cient to explain the CRSP issuance pattern.
Next, I study the PlacementTracker database. PlacementTracker contains only
private issuances, which I subdivide by common equity, convertible preferred shares,
and convertible debt. PlacementTracker also provides information on contingent
claims, such as warrants and structured convertibles. As contingent claims could
potentially increase the number of shares outstanding, I also study the proportion of
issuances that include them in the cross-section of distress.
PlacementTracker and SDC Platinums private issuance data are rst compared
to verify if one subsumes the other.26 From 1995 to 2008, the period during which
the two databases overlap, I nd that 87% of SDC Platinum data are also included in
PlacementTracker, while PlacementTracker has more than twice as many observations
as SDC Platinum. Moreover, most of the observations in SDC Platinum that are also
included in PlacementTracker do not have information on contingent claims. This
comparison shows that SDC Platinums private issuance data are unreliable compared
to those in PlacementTracker.
The cross-sectional distribution of observations from PlacementTracker is de-
scribed in more detail in Table VIII. Panel A shows the number of observations for
each type. The number of observations increases monotonically following the degree
of distress for all types of equity issuance. Common equity observations increase from
26 observations in the lowest-distress decile bin to 783 in the highest-distress decile
bin. Convertible issuances show similarly increasing patterns. Convertible preferred
shares increase from 7 in the lowest-distress decile bin to 401 in the highest-distress
26I match SDC Platinum private issuance observations with PlacementTracker observations by
rm, issuance type, and gross proceeds within a 5% di¤erence and allow for a 1 month di¤erence,
as some dates do not match exactly.
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decile bin. Convertible debts also increase from 97 in the lowest-distress decile bin to
279 in the highest-distress decile bin. The total number of private issuance observa-
tions monotonically increases from 130 observations in the lowest-distress decile bin to
1,463 observations in the highest-distress decile bin. This private issuance distribution
matches the monotonically increasing pattern observed in the CRSP database.
The distribution of contingent claims is presented in Panel B of Table VIII. The
rst four rows present the proportion of issuances with warrants attached. For all
types of issuances, the proportion of equity attached with warrants increases. For the
total, the proportion of equity issuance attached with warrants increases monotoni-
cally from 5.4% in the lowest-distress decile bin to 56.6% in the highest-distress decile
bin, following the degree of distress. The next three rows report the proportion of
structured convertible issuances. For both types of convertibles, the proportion in-
creases from 1.0% in the lowest-distress decile bin to 36.0% in the highest-distress
bin. In sum, the distribution of private placement frequencies and their attached
contingent claims represents the increasing equity issuance pattern observed in the
CRSP database.
Finally, I examine CRSPs net issuance, SDC Platinums public issuances, and
PlacementTrackers private issuances to illustrate their relative distribution in the
cross-section of distress. I use the total number of issuance observations, regardless
of type of issuance. As the databases sample periods do not coincide, I annualize the
total number of observations by dividing the number of years each database covers.
In Figure 3, we can observe that CRSP issuance frequencies increase as the degree of
distress increases, but many low-distress rms still issue equity. Many of the issuances
for low-distress rms are from public SEOs. As distress level increases, the number
of public issuances decreases and private issuances monotonically increase, showing
43
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that private issuances are the primary source of the distressed equity issuance.
The distributions of these databases highlight several data implications for SDC
Platinum, the primary data source for equity issuance after 1980. First, SEO obser-
vations of SDC Platinum do not represent the CRSP population, and will not lead
to a positive relationship between distress and equity issuance. Other motivations
(such as market timing) might provide better explanations for public issuances, but
distress seems to be the main motivation for many other issuances.
Second, SDC Platinums private issuance data seem to be unreliable. When SDC
Platinum data after 1995 are compared with PlacementTracker data for the same time
period, many observations and important points of information are missing.27 For the
earlier period from 1975 to 1994 that PlacementTracker does not cover, I conjecture
that the source of missing distressed issuance is again some type of private issuance.
CRSP net issuances increase for distressed rms, but SDC Platinums public issuance
observations are distributed in a hump-shaped pattern for the 1975 to 1994 period,
suggesting that distress rms issue equity through methods other than SEOs.
By denition, private issuances are less publicly known and are more likely to be
overlooked by SDC Platinum than public issuances. Furthermore, the EDGAR SEC
electronic ling system was implemented in 1994, which might explain the di¢culty
of SDC Platinum identifying private issuances before 1995. To further verify this
conjecture, I compare SDC Platinum with private issuance data used in Hertzel,
27Fama and French (2005) match CRSP/Compustat issuances with SDC Platinum issuances and
also nd that many CRSP issuances are not well-matched, especially in small rms. They conjecture
that the missing observations are a form of employee stock options. However, I nd that many of the
missing issuance are concentrated in distressed rms. I also check the distribution of equity-nanced
M&As in the cross-section of distress, nding that they are distributed in a hump-shaped pattern
over distress portfolios, which does not explain the positive issuance pattern found in CRSP.
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Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002).28 Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) identify
619 private placements by searching Dow Jones News Retrieval Service from 1980
to 1996. These private placements are most heavily concentrated in the periods
from 1985 to 1987 and 1991 to 1993. I nd that less than 10% of Hertzel et al.s
private placement observations are found in SDC Platinum, while their dataset has a
similar number of observations as SDC Platinum. This conrms that SDC Platinum
misrepresents private issuance observations both before and after 1995.
In sum, comparing equity issuance databases suggests that research based on pub-
lic or private issuance separately could be misleading. By looking at public and private
issuance together, this paper nds that equity o¤erings are positively correlated with
distressbut primarily by private issuances, which have not drawn as much research
as public SEOs. SEOs seem to be the equity issuance tool of less distressed rms.
To achieve a comprehensive view of the equity issuance pattern observed in CRSP
requires complementing SEO data with private issuance data with more observations
and correct discount and contingent claim information.
6 Value Transfer Hypothesis
Private placements are issued at a high discount to market price, generally to outside
investors.29 This kind of discounted issuance would dilute existing shareholders and
transfer value to the new shareholders through discounted private issuances. The fact
that the low returns of distressed stocks are concentrated in net issuers that primarily
issue equity privately leads me to investigate whether the low returns of issuers can be
28I thank Michael Lemmon and James Linck for providing private placement data.
29See Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010) Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009), and Wu (2004).
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attributed to dilution. In this section, I nd evidence supporting this value transfer
hypothesis from both equity returns and the distribution of private issuances around
a shareholder approval threshold.
6.1 Total Equity Returns of Aggregate Shareholders
To test the value transfer hypothesis, I use stock returns to study whether existing
shareholders gain abnormal negative returns, whether new shareholders (i.e., private
placement investors) gain positive returns, and whether the aggregate shareholders
gain normal returns. These patterns of returns would suggest that the low returns of
distressed rms are due to value transfer to new shareholders.
I test the value transfer hypothesis in an event study setting. To be consistent with
the rest of the paper, I require observations to have assigned CHS at the beginning
of the year. I limit my sample to PlacementTracker observations that provide specic
contract terms to calculate returns for new investors. Structured convertibles that do
not have a oor to the variable conversion rate are excluded.30
The returns of shareholders are from a simple buy and hold strategy beginning on
the closing day of the PIPE issuance for a one-year period consistent with the portfolio
holding period used throughout the paper. I calculate investor returns by comparing
initial investment (total proceeds) in the PIPE and end-of-period total value of all
features included in the contract (i.e., equity, warrants, convertibles, dividends, and
interests). The total equity returns are calculated by combining existing shareholder
returns with returns to new investors using the value-weight of existing market equity
and total proceeds of equity issuance. Returns are calculated in excess of Fama and
30These convertibles were restricted by SEC after 2000 because of their toxic features, which will
be discussed later.
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Frenchs size and book-to-market 25 benchmark matched returns.31 Appendix B
contains details of calculating investor returns.
Table IX presents mean post-issue returns for di¤erent shareholders. The three
columns represent mean abnormal returns for existing shareholders, new investors,
and aggregate shareholders. In the rst row I look at the full sample. Existing
shareholders achieve a statistically signicant negative abnormal return of  4.21% (t-
stat =  2.91), while private issuance investors achieve signicant positive abnormal
return of 19.97% (t-stat = 8.98). The total equity return of aggregate investors is a
statistically insignicant return of  1.21% (t-stat =  0.81). These return patterns
are consistent with the hypothesis that value is transferred to new investors.
In the following rows, I subdivide the sample by common equity issuance and
convertibles. Common equity issuance rms, which comprise 56% (2,848) of the to-
tal sample, have negative statistically signicant returns of  5.07 (t-stat =  2.63)
for existing shareholders. Conversely, they produce positive statistically signicant
abnormal returns of 15.01% (t-stat = 4.44) for new investors. The aggregate share-
holders of both existing and new shares have a statistically insignicant mean return
of  3.03 (t-stat =  1.49). Convertibles have statistically insignicant but negative
returns of  3.13 (t-stat =  1.43). However, the new investors still achieve a positive
return of 26.22% (t-stat = 9.82), and the total equity return is a statistically insignif-
icant 1.08% (t-stat = 0.49). Such return patterns are again consistent with the full
sample, suggesting value transfer.
I also subdivide the sample into non-structured convertibles (i.e., common equity
and xed rate convertibles) and structured convertibles. The fourth row presents the
returns for non-structured issuance, which comprises 95% (4,873) of the sample. Ex-
31Returns adjusted by market returns yield similar results.
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Table IX: Total Equity Returns of Aggregate Shareholders
The table presents the one-year post-issue mean abnormal returns of existing shareholders, PIPE
investors, and aggregate shareholders. Fama and French 25 size and book-to-market matched port-
folio returns at the beginning of the year are used as the benchmark for abnormal returns. The
return of existing shareholder is a one-year buy and hold strategy starting on the closing day of the
PIPE issuance. The returns of new investors are calculated using the details of the PIPE contracts.
I calculate the investor return by comparing total initial investment and the value of all related
securities at the end of the one-year period (i.e., warrants, convertibles, dividends, and interests).
See Appendix B for details. The aggregate returns of the total equity are calculated by aggregating
existing share returns with returns of new investors using the value-weight of existing market equity
and the total proceeds of new equity issuance. Daily Fama and French 25 size and book-to-market
returns are from Ken Frenchs website. The statistical signicance at the 5% and 1% levels is denoted
by * and **, respectively, and the t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
Mean Abnormal Returns
Observations Shareholder Investor Aggregate
Full Sample 5,113 -4.21** 19.97** -1.21
(-2.91) (8.98) (-0.81)
Subsample
Common 2,848 -5.07** 15.01** -3.03
(-2.63) (4.44) (-1.49)
Convertibles 2,265 -3.13 26.22** 1.08
(-1.43) (9.82) (0.49)
Non-Structured 4,873 -3.33* 20.78** -0.27
(-2.28) (8.98) (-0.18)
Structured 240 -22.09** 3.64 -20.23**
(-2.70) (0.60) (-2.68)
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isting shareholders have statistically signicant negative abnormal returns of  3.33%
(t-stat =  2.28), while new investors have a signicant positive return of 20.78% (t-
stat = 8.98). The total equity gains insignicant abnormal return of  0.27% (t-stat
=  0.18), which is even smaller than the full sample aggregate returns. This is also
consistent with the value transfer hypothesis.
The last row presents structured convertible issuances, which consist of 240 obser-
vations (5% of the full sample). The one-year abnormal return for existing sharehold-
ers is low at  22.09% (t-stat =  2.70). Although the new investor achieves a mean
return of 3.64% (t-stat = 0.60), as a result of existing shareholders low returns, the
aggregate returns are signicantly negative at  20.23% (t-stat =  2.60). This is not
consistent with the value transfer hypothesis, but rather consistent with the faulty
contract hypothesis of Hillion and Vermaelen (2004).
The faulty contract hypothesis suggests that the structured convertible features
encourage short selling by equity investors and, in doing so, cause a permanent price
decline. These convertibles are commonly referred to as death spirals or toxic con-
vertibles. Beginning in early 2000, the SEC restricted structured convertible PIPEs
without oors.32 Figure 4 presents the time series proportion of variable rate convert-
ibles among the convertibles and the proportion of issuances with warrants attached
to them. Figure 4 shows that only about 10% of the convertibles were structured after
2000. Capturing the true return of the investors with shorting strategies is out of the
scope of a simple buy and hold strategy. The signicant negative abnormal return of
structured convertibles, although not consistent with the value transfer hypothesis,
still contributes to the low returns of distressed rms.
Non-structured equity issuances, which comprise 95% of the sample, have stock
32See SEC v. Rhino Advisors, Inc. and Thomas Badian, Civ. Action. No. 03 civ 1310 (RO).
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return patterns consistent with the value transfer hypothesis. Those rms that issue
equity privately do not underperform when the returns of existing and new sharehold-
ers are combined, contrary to earlier empirical studies based only on existing share-
holders. This nding suggests that distressed rms that issue equity privately perform
poorly because of value transfer to new investors through discounted issuances.
6.2 Shareholder Approval Rule
Next, I study whether existing shareholders approve of such dilutive measures of
issuing discounted equity. Assuming that management makes issuance decisions in
the best interest of shareholders, equity should be issued only when the expected cost
(e.g., dilution) is smaller than the expected benets (e.g., decrease in distress cost).
However, managers have incentives to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy, even when
the actions do not necessarily maximize shareholder value.33 These actions might
cost existing shareholders more than the benet from the action. Since it is di¢cult
to weigh the costs and benets directly in the case of discounted PIPEs, I use a
shareholder approval rule to study whether the interests of shareholders are aligned
with the decision of issuing discounted equity, and I study market reactions to such
decisions.
NASDAQ Rule 5635 sets forth the regulations regarding shareholder approval of
listed rms. In particular, Rule 5635(d)34 requires issuers to obtain prior approval of
shareholders when the issuance or potential issuance at a price equal to or less than
the greater of book or market value equals 20% or more of common shares or 20% or
33Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention job security under distress risk as a main factor leading to
misalignment of interest.
34NYSE rule 312.03 and NYSE Amex Equities Sec. 713. exhibit similar rules for discounted
privately issued equity for more than 20% of the existing shares.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Privately Issued Equity
The scatter plot presents common equity issuance by the fraction of equity issued and the pre-
mium/discount at issuance. The horizontal axis represents the fraction of newly issued shares to
existing shares. The vertical axis represents the premium/discounts of issuance price of the PIPE
contract compared to market closing price of the day before the PIPE contract. Histograms of
percents for each 0.25% width are presented towards the left and bottom of the scatter plot. The
common equity issuance data are from the PlacementTracker database for the period from 1995 to
2008.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Privately Issued Equity by Fraction of Equity Issued
The gure presents the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the histogram of discounted
common equity issuance by the fraction of newly issued shares to existing shares. Histograms of
percents for each 0.25% width are presented in the bottom panel. The common equity issuance data
are from the PlacementTracker database for the period from 1995 to 2008.
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more of the voting power outstanding before the issuance. I look at the distribution
of issuance around this threshold, using only common equity private issuances.35
Figure 5 presents the distribution of common equity private issuances. The x -
axis represents the fraction of equity issued relative to existing shares, and the y-axis
represents the premium/discount. By looking at the distribution, we can observe the
uneven number of observations in the discounted issuances above the 20% threshold.
More importantly, issuances are clustered just below the 20% threshold.
I take a closer look at this distribution by studying the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) and the histogram for discounted equity issuance in Figure 6. Both
the CDF and the histogram show a distribution discontinuity at the 20% threshold.
This distribution discontinuity identies managers who avoid seeking shareholder ap-
proval when issuing discounted equity. This suggests that issuing discounted equity
might not be in the best interests of existing shareholders.
To further study how the market reacts to such behavior, I look at closing day
returns and one-year returns after each issuance in Table X. I nd that returns
for these rms that issue discounted equity below the 20% threshold and do not go
through the shareholder approval are negative, while returns are positive for rms
that go through shareholder approval.
Specically, Table X presents returns of discounted common equity issuance by
bins of di¤erent issuance fractions. Observations are limited to discounted issuances
as the ones issued at a premium do not require shareholder approval at any fraction
of issuance. Bins are created centered on the 20% shareholder approval threshold.
The rst row shows the closing day return (1 day) of the common equity issuance.
35Observations are limited to common equity issuance because calculation of the fraction and
discount amount is not straightforward for convertible shares. Detail on calculation of the fraction
can be found in Appendix C.
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The closing day return exhibits a statistically signicant negative abnormal return
for observations closest to the 20% threshold. The 15%-20% fraction bin exhibits
returns of  1.71 (t-stat =  3.30) and the 17.5%-20% fraction bin exhibits returns of
 1.56 (t-stat =  2.21). The returns for bins that include observations with less than
15% fraction are negative but statistically insignicant. This shows that the market
responds negatively to equity issuance that is closer to, but not above, the 20%
threshold. This negative response is consistent with private issuance not maximizing
shareholder value when avoiding shareholder approval.
On the other hand, observations for bins of fractions larger than 20% have positive
closing day abnormal returns. The abnormal return for the 20%-22.5% fraction bin
is statistically insignicantly but positive at 3.56 (t-stat = 1.40). This bin, however,
includes only 27 observations and also has a high chance of including observations from
measurement error in calculating the fraction issued. When the bin size is increased
by raising the upper limit of issuance fraction, shareholder-approved issuances gain
statistically signicant positive returns. When including all observations from 20%
to 40%, I nd statistically signicant abnormal returns of 3.19 (t-stat = 2.50).
The second row of Table X presents the post-issue one-year stock returns. It
shows that when shareholders do not approve the issuances, post-issue returns have
statistically signicant negative results. This e¤ect is stronger for issuance with larger
fractions up to but not more than the 20% threshold. Returns for the 0% to 20%
bin exhibit an abnormal return of  9.17 (t-stat =  3.97), while the returns for the
17.5% to 20% bin exhibit an abnormal return of  15.21 (t-stat =  3.11).
The patterns of returns below and above the 20% approval threshold suggest that
approved private issuances are aligned with existing shareholders interests, while the
ones that avoid approval by issuing below the threshold are not. Notice that rms that
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issue above the threshold issue larger fractions of equity at a discount, yet achieve non-
negative market response to the issuance. This suggests that when private discounted
issuances are in the best interests of existing shareholders, the benet outweighs the
cost of dilution. However, in the case of many other PIPEs below the shareholder
approval threshold, return patterns suggest that the cost outweighs the benet.
6.2.1 Characteristics of Shareholder Approval Avoiding Firms
I further study the decision to avoid shareholder approval using the characteristics of
rms. I use a logit regression to predict the decision to avoid shareholder approval by
issuing less than the 20% shareholder approval threshold. The left hand side variable
is one if the fraction of equity issued is above 15% and less than 20% (i.e., avoiding
shareholder approval), and zero otherwise.
For the right hand side variables, I include variables that could test whether
the decision to avoid shareholder approval is aligned with shareholder interest. I
denote the hypothesis where the decision to avoid shareholder approval is aligned
the alignment hypothesis and the hypothesis where the decision is not aligned the
misalignment hypothesis.
In particular, I look at cases where the procedure of gaining shareholder approval
is costly, and therefore avoiding shareholder approval could be optimal for shareholder
value. I rst include issuance discounts as the direct cost measure of issuance. Share-
holder approval could be avoided because the discount rate is higher and therefore
more costly for shareholders due to dilution. The coe¢cient should be positive to
support the alignment hypothesis.
An alternative cost of shareholder approval is distress and timeliness of the private
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issuance.36 I include Failure P^ ; cash and short-term investment (CASHMTA), and
BURN rate as proxies for distress. BURN rate is dened as CASHMTA divided by
net income (NIMTAAVG). I also look at the use of proceeds reported by Placement-
Tracker. Firms in distress that avoid shareholder approval should generally indicate
the use of proceeds to be repaying indebtedness or interest. I include an indicator
function (IDebt Reduction ) that is one if the use of proceeds includes debt-related use,
and zero otherwise. These four variables should have positive coe¢cients to support
the alignment hypothesis.
Another cost of shareholder approval is that shareholders are unsophisticated. If
shareholders cannot make the right decision, gaining shareholder approval is costly.
I include institutional holdings from Thomson Reuters database as a variable.37 I
aggregate all equity institutional holdings as of the end of year t-1 and calculate the
percentage of shares outstanding. The coe¢cient for institutional holdings should
be negative to support the alignment hypothesis. I also include RSIZE and MB to
control for general characteristics of rms.
Finally, I include variables that proxy for managers interest being more closely
related to rm value. Managers with more equity shares would have interests closely
aligned with other shareholders.38 Using managers equity holdings from Thomson
Reuters database, I proxy for the alignment of managers interests with shareholders.
36An exception to the shareholder approval rule can be made when a delay in equity nancing
would seriously jeopardize the nancial viability of the rm. NASDAQ rule 5635(f), NYSE rule
312.05, and NYSE Amex Equities Sec. 710(b) exhibit the nancial viability exception. Reliance on
this exception is expressly approved by the audit committee or a comparable body of the board of
directors composed solely of independent, disinterested directors. This nancial viability exception
weakens the argument that managers avoid approval due to distress.
37A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires all institutions with
more than $100 million of securities to report their holdings to the SEC through 13(f).
38See Holmström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983).
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At least six months before the issuance I aggregate both direct and indirect shares of
managers (CEO, CFO and COO) and divide by total shares as percentages.
I also include an indicator function (IMgmt Particip) that is one if managers and
board members participate in the private issuance. Manager participation will indi-
cate that managers are willing to invest in a rms value. I also control for the case in
which managers participate but already hold shares. If managers already hold shares
in the company, additional participation in discounted equity could prevent managers
shares from being diluted, rather than showing commitment to the companys value.39
I include the interaction term between managers shares and participation to control
for this case. Managers shares and IMgmt Particip should have positive coe¢cients to
support the misalignment hypothesis.
Table XI presents the results. I limit my observations to those rms that issue
discounted common equity with fractions between 15% and 40%, which leaves 488
observations. When I include management shares, the sample size reduces to 218.
First, I look at regression (1). We can observe that the discount amount is neg-
atively correlated with avoidance of  0.01 (t-stat =  0.62), but not statistically
signicant. This suggests that private issuance of observations that avoid shareholder
approval are not necessarily more costly.
Failure probability, Failure P^ ; has a positive but statistically insignicant coef-
cient (0.14 [t-stat] = 0.33). Both CASHMTA and BURN also have statistically
insignicant coe¢cients. The coe¢cient for debt-related use of proceeds of PIPEs is
positive but statistically insignicant. These four variables suggest that rms that
avoid shareholder approval are not more distressed than the ones that gain share-
39See Wu (2004) for the relationship between manager shares, participation, self-dealing and PIPE
discounts.
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Table XI: Logit Regression of PIPE Shareholder Approval Avoidance
The table presents the results of logistic regressions predicting privately issued equity with share-
holder approval. The left hand side variable is one if the fraction of equity issued is less than 20%
(i.e., shareholder approval avoidance), and zero otherwise. The right hand side variables include
measures of distress and characteristics of the rm. See text for denition of each variable. Dis-
counted common equity PIPEs observations with fraction of equity issued between 15% and 40%
are included.
IAvoid (Fraction of Equity Issued<20%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Discount -0.01 0.03 0.03
(-0.62) (1.01) (0.95)
Failure P 0.14 -0.70 -1.40
(0.33) (-0.62) (-1.19)
CASHMTA -1.58 -2.24 -3.62
(-1.16) (-0.94) (-1.40)
BURN -0.60 1.41 1.63
(-1.56) (0.81) (0.86)
IDebt Reduction -0.65 -0.29 -0.54
(-1.47) (-0.33) (-0.59)
Inst Shares 0.01 0.01 0.02
(1.68) (0.49) (1.08)
RSIZE 0.83** 0.91** 0.89**
(5.03) (3.28) (3.00)
MB -0.28** -0.25 -0.26
(-3.14) (-1.37) (-1.30)
Mgmt Shares -0.03* -0.05**
(-2.19) (-2.63)
IMgmt Particip -3.26* -4.17**
(-2.34) (-2.62)
Mgmt SharesIMgmt Particip 0.44 0.93
(0.88) (1.59)
No. of Obs 488 218 218 218
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.20
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holder approval. Therefore, these results do not support the alignment hypothesis.
Coe¢cients for institutional shareholder shares are negative (0.01 [t-stat] = 1.68)
but statistically insignicant. This also suggests that avoiding shareholder approval
cannot be explained by shareholders being unsophisticated. Therefore, it does not
support the alignment hypothesis.
In regression (2), I look at manager-related variables. I nd that managers equity
shares are negatively correlated with avoiding shareholder approval ( 0.03 [t-stat =
 2.19]). Manager participation is also negatively correlated with avoiding share-
holder approval ( 3.26 [t-stat =  2.34]). The interaction term between managers
participation and shares is positive but statistically insignicant. The signs of these
three coe¢cients are consistent with the misalignment hypothesis. When managers
interests are closely aligned with shareholders, avoidance of shareholder approval is
less likely to happen.
Regression (3) includes variables in regression (1) but only uses the smaller sample
of 218 that has manager variables. The sign of the coe¢cient for Failure P^ is now
positive but still statistically insignicant. Regression (4) includes all characteristics
of the rms including manager-related variables. The results are consistent with
regressions (2) and (3).
In sum, I do not nd support for the alignment hypothesis but nd support for
the misalignment hypothesis. Shareholder approval is not avoided because of the cost
of the shareholder approval process, but because the interests of managers and equity
holders are misaligned.
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6.2.2 Returns, Dilution and Shareholder Approval
I revisit the abnormal closing day returns and one-year returns. I use the discounted
common equity issuance sample with fraction of equity issued between 15% and 40%.
I study the relationship among returns and dilution and shareholder approval. I use
fraction of equity issued, discount and the indicator function (I Approval ) of issuing more
than 20% of existing shares as explanatory variables. I also include manager-related
variables used in the previous section.40
The results are presented in Table XII. In regression (1), I nd that fraction of
equity issued is positively related to the closing day abnormal returns with a coe¢cient
of 0.23 (t-stat = 2.45). Initially, this result seems to go against the value transfer
hypothesis. Firms that issue more at a higher discount have higher returns.
However, once the approval indicator is included in regression (2) we can observe
that the coe¢cient for fraction of equity issued becomes negative  0.27 (t-stat =
 1.73) and statistically signicant at the 10% level. The coe¢cient for discount also
becomes statistically signicant at the 5% level with coe¢cient of  0.10 (t-stat =
 2.08). The approval indicator function is positive and statistically signicant at the
1% level.
These three coe¢cients show that dilution and shareholder approval are impor-
tant in closing day returns. This also implies that without knowing the shareholder
approval rule, people might make an incorrect inference by simply running closing
day returns on fraction of equity issued or discounts.
When manager-related variables are included in regression (3), statistical inference
and signs of the rst three coe¢cients are the same. The manager-related variables
40Other distress-related characters are not statistically signicant when included.
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are all insignicant.
For the one-year abnormal returns in regression (4), I again nd that the fraction
of equity issued is positively correlated with returns, with a coe¢cient of 0.34 (t-
stat = 0.40). The coe¢cient for discount is negative and statistically signicant at
 1.08 (t-stat =  2.45). When the approval indicator is included in regression (5), we
can observe that the sign of the coe¢cient for the fraction of equity issued becomes
negative as in regression (2). The signs and statistical inference of the three variables
are consistent with those in regression (2). This suggests that dilution and shareholder
approval are important for long-run returns.
When manager-related variables are included in regression (6), all variables except
the manager shares become statistically insignicant. Manager shares have a positive
coe¢cient of 1.20 (t-stat = 2.46). The positive coe¢cient of manager shares supports
the misalignment hypothesis.
In this section, I nd evidence from stock market returns and from rms that avoid
shareholder approval supporting the value transfer hypothesis. Dilution and agency
problems are important for stock market reaction to issuing equity privately. These
ndings are consistent with Wu (2004), Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2007),
and others that suggest that managerial entrenchment is the main motivation behind
issuing equity privately.
7 Discussion
This paper explains the low returns of distressed rms by showing that distressed
rms issue equity mainly through private issuance, and that value transfer occurs
with discounts. However, some questions at the center of equity issue research have
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not been addressed in this paper.
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) and others document that private place-
ments have positive announcement-day e¤ects but negative post-announcement per-
formance. This suggests that investors are overly optimistic about the prospects of
rms that are issuing equity. If we assume that markets are e¢cient, changes in
equity price should immediately reect any information known to the public. Behav-
ioral explanations of underreaction or overcondence could help explain these results.
Attention to an ine¢cient market or lag of information dissemination might also be
able to provide insights. This paper, however, does not provide an explanation for
why the dilution e¤ect does not appear immediately after the equity issuance.
Since private issuance investors have statistically signicant positive returns through
discounts, another question arises of whether existing shareholders actually partici-
pate in the discounted issuances. Many studies focus on the identities of the investors
and post-issue returns.41 However, most papers suggest that it is di¢cult to argue
that the majority of PIPE investors are existing shareholders.
This brings us back to the question of why existing shareholders do not participate
in the discounted equity issuances through the form of rights o¤erings. Assuming that
the existing shareholders know the true value of the rm, shareholders should want
to participate in order to gain higher returns from the discounted issuances. It could
be the case that existing shareholders do not have su¢cient funds to inject into the
distressed company. However, this violates the asset pricing assumption that investors
can always borrow at the risk-free rate to invest in risky portfolios. The shareholder
41Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009), Wruck and Wu (2009), Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan
(2007), Dai (2007), and others test the certication hypothesis or managerial entrenchment hypoth-
esis by discussing the identities of PIPE investors, focusing their attention on the performance of
existing shareholders related to the identities of investors
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approval rule discussion shows that existing shareholders might not even have the
opportunity to participate in discounted issuance.
If the existing shareholders do not participate because they believe that the equity
value is even lower than the discounted price or because they do not have the oppor-
tunity to participate, the question remains as to why they hold on to these distressed
rms, since they are overpriced and have a high probability of being diluted.
My paper does not focus on these questions. It rather concentrates its attention
on documenting the positive correlation of distress and equity issuance and o¤ering
empirical evidence that is suggestive of value transfer from existing shareholders to
new investors.
8 Conclusion
This paper documents the positive correlation between degree of distress and equity
issuance, and shows that the low returns of distressed rms are found only in high net
issuers. Building on these results, my paper further identies privately issued equity
to be the main source of the distressed equity issuance. When returns of existing
shareholders are combined with returns of new investors, total equity returns are
statistically insignicant. One potential explanation is that distressed rms perform
poorly because of the value transfer from existing shareholders to new investors when
equity is issued privately, and that existing shareholders do not seem to anticipate
this value transfer.
This paper has several implications for future research. First, it provides insight
into the problems around the use of SEO databases, such as SDC Platinum. Unless
complemented by private issuances, the data do not provide a comprehensive view of
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the equity issuance population. As a result, any conclusions using such data could be
misleading.
My paper shows that distressed rms indeed issue equity. But by showing that
rms issue at discount, my paper suggests a new channel of value transfer for dis-
tressed rms. For asset pricing, the paper suggests that future research on the distress
anomaly and net issuance puzzle should be concentrated on distressed equity issuing
rms. It also implies that agency problems could be important in understanding the
stock return patterns of distressed equity issuers.
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Appendices
A Distress Anomaly
Constructing CHS Measure
This section discusses the construction of the Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)
distress measure. The explanatory variables included in the measure are constructed
as follows:
NIMTAit =
Net Incomeit
(MEit+Total Liabilityit)
TLMTAit =
Total Liabilityit
(MEit+Total Liabilityit)
CASHMTAit =
Cash and Short Term Investmentsit
(MEit+Total Liabilityit)
RSIZEit = log

MEit
Total S&P500 Market V alueit

EXRETit = log(1 +Rit)  log(1 +RS&P500;t)
MBit =
MEit
BEit
;
where MEit is price time shares outstanding and book equity (BEit) is initially con-
structed as Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) have done. Following Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), book equity is then adjusted by adding the 10% di¤er-
ence between market and book equity. For rms that still have negative values for
book equity, I assign positive values of $1 to ensure that they are in the right tail of
market-to-book distribution rather than in the left tail.
The volatility measure is the annualized 3-month return standard deviation, cal-
culated by
SIGMAi;t 1;t 3 =
 
252 1
N 1
P
k2ft 1;t 2;t 3g
r2i;k
!1=2
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SIGMA is coded as missing if less than ve nonzero observations exist over the 3-
month period. In this case, it is replaced with its cross-sectional mean. Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) construct a geometrically decreasing average ofNIMTA
and EXRET;
NIMTAAV Gt 1;t 12 =
1 3
1 12
 
NIMTAt 1;t 3 + :::+ 
9NIMTAt 10;t 12

EXRETAV Gt 1;t 12 =
1 
1 12
EXRETt 1 + :::+ 
11NIMTAt 12;
where the coe¢cient  = 2 
1
3 :
When the variables are missing, past NIMTA and EXRET are also replaced
with the cross-sectional means in calculating the average measures NIMTAAV G and
EXRETAV G. However, the distress measure requires leverage, protability, excess
return, and market capitalization to be valid. All explanatory variables are cross-
sectionally winsorized above and below the 5% level in order to eliminate outliers,
except for PRICE (where the value is winsorized above $15).
Distress Anomaly and Characteristics
This section replicates Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) over the extended
period from 1975 to 2008 and displays the characteristics of the distress portfolios.
The distress-sorted value-weighted excess returns are presented in Table AI.
My results are comparable to those of Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008).
In the rst row, the excess returns decrease following the distress decile sort. The
risk-adjusted returns in rows 2 and 3 show that risk adjustments to distress stocks
make the anomaly exacerbate, rather than explain, because distressed rms load
positively on market, HML, and SMB. Row 4 shows that including the momentum
factor partially explains the low returns of distressed rms, decreasing the spread.
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Long-short regressions on the far right two columns show that CAPM, Fama and
French 3-factor, and Carhart 4-factor adjusted returns are statistically signicant.
The factor loadings in Panel B exhibit the positive loadings on market returns, HML,
and SMB, and negative loadings on momentum.
Momentum is the only factor that reduces the distress anomaly. As past excess
returns are included in CHS, I further document the return correlation with the
momentum factor for 3-, 6-, 12- and 24-month rebalancing periods at the beginning
of each quarter, at the beginning of the year and at the beginning of July, at the
beginning of each year, and at the beginning of every other year, respectively.
Table AII shows the mean monthly excess returns for portfolios with di¤erent
rebalancing periods. In Panel A, the returns decrease for portfolios with rebalancing
periods of less than 24 months. Portfolios with shorter rebalancing periods exhibit
a stronger monotonic decreasing pattern. Panel B exhibits the long-short quintile
distress portfolio returns. The magnitude of the long-short distress portfolio returns
decreases for portfolios with longer rebalancing periods. Panel C exhibits the momen-
tum loadings. The loading pattern shows that the strong momentum e¤ect becomes
weaker for portfolios with longer rebalancing periods. Panel D presents the 4-factor
loadings on the long-short distress quintile portfolios for di¤erent rebalancing peri-
ods. The pattern exhibits the decreasing coe¢cient of the momentum factor, while
the other three factors generally persist over di¤erent rebalancing periods.
The momentum factor is constructed by using past 2 to 12-month returns and
by rebalancing monthly (see Ken Frenchs website for details). The stronger load-
ing patterns on the momentum factor for shorter rebalancing period portfolios are
natural, as CHS includes past returns (EXRETAVG). Portfolios with shorter rebal-
ancing periods use past returns that overlap with past returns that are used to form
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momentum factor and therefore have a stronger correlation. The at pattern of 24-
month returns seems similar to the reversal e¤ect of momentum. It shows that a
more patient strategy would allow the low returns of distressed rms to recover over
a longer horizon.
B PIPE Investor Return
The returns of new investors are calculated using the details of the PIPE contracts. I
assume that investors invest the total proceeds issued by PIPE contracts on the closing
day and hold all related securities for a one-year period. Returns are calculated by
comparing total initial investment and the value of all related securities at the end of
one year.
At the end of the one-year period, common equity value is calculated by multiply-
ing the shares invested in the issuance by the equity price at the end of the period.
Warrants are valued by multiplying the number of warrants by the di¤erence between
exercise and equity prices. I assign a value of zero to the warrants when the warrants
are out of the money.
Convertibles are valued by the maximum of market value of the underlying pre-
ferred share/debt and the fully converted equity value. Since it is di¢cult to obtain
the actual market price of the underlying preferred share/debt, I use the CHS mea-
sure for the probability of failure with a recovery rate of zero to approximate the
market value of the underlying asset. Fully converted equity value is the number
of equity shares convertible (face value of preferred shares/debt divided by exercise
price) multiplied by the end-of-period equity price. Accrued interest rate and dividend
are added to the returns. If rms delist before the one-year period for performance
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reasons, as dened by Shumway and Warther (1999) and Shumway (1997), I assume
the underlying security value to be zero.
Calculating converted equity value of structured convertibles is a bit tricky because
the conversion price is not xed. Discounts to the market price at time of conversion
are stated in PIPE contracts. Additionally, some contracts have a look-back period
and an evaluation period for further discounts. For example, the contract could
list the conversion price as 85% of the average of the 10 lowest closing bid prices
during the 20 trading days immediately preceding conversion. In this case, the xed
discounted conversion price would be 85% of the market price, the evaluation period
would be 10 days, and the look-back period would be 20 days. PlacementTracker
assumes additional discounts in these cases. If the number of days in the evaluation
period is equal to or greater than 50% of the number of days in the look-back period,
PlacementTracker assumes an additional 5% discount. If the number of prices taken
to measure the average price during the evaluation period is less than 50% of the
number of days in the look-back period, PlacementTracker assumes an additional
discount of 10%. Although these additional discounts are somewhat arbitrary, they
help standardize the way I calculate the conversion price of structured convertibles.
If the exercise price is less than the oor, I use the oor price as the conversion price.
(Ceilings are used in case exercise price is more than the ceiling). After the conversion
price for structured convertibles is found, valuing the converted equity value is the
same as the xed-rate convertibles.
The calculations of investor returns are conservative in several aspects. First, I
assign zero value to out of the money warrants and the convertible option feature of
convertibles. Second, I assume a zero recovery rate when calculating the market value
of underlying preferred shares or debt. Third, I assume investment value to be zero
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when performance-wise delisting occurs before the one-year period. Assigning positive
values to the exercising option value of warrants and convertibles using the Black-
Scholes (1973) model would further increase the value of investors. However, correctly
pricing the option as a defaultable American option is di¢cult without making more
assumptions about the underlying asset. Assigning positive values to the recovery rate
of debt or preferred shares would also increase the value of the underlying preferred
shares and debt in valuing the convertible issuance. Through sensitivity analysis, I
nd that my results are robust against all reasonable range of parameters calculating
PIPE investor returns. As these calculations would require additional assumptions
to calculate, I present the most simple and conservative results.
C Equity Issuance Fraction
I calculate shares counted towards the 20% rule by following rules and common prac-
tice of NASDAQ and other exchanges. The market price is measured by the closing
price on one day prior to the close of the equity issuance. Premiums and discounts are
calculated relative to market price. NASDAQ historically assigns a value of $0.125
over any amount that the warrants exercise price is below market price. For instance,
if the closing price is $2.00, then warrants issued with exercise price more than $2.125
will not be counted towards the total equity issued. However, any warrant issued that
is less than $2.125 would be aggregated with any equity that is issued at a discount
to determine the need for shareholder approval. I include shares of warrants if the
exercise price of the warrant is less than the $0.125 premium. NASDAQ will generally
look back 6 months to aggregate similar transactions to determine whether the 20%
threshold has been triggered. Following this procedure, I aggregate all shares that
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have been issued in the past 6 months to calculate the total shares of equity issued.
To calculate the shares outstanding, I use the amount reported by Placement-
Tracker. PlacementTracker collects shares outstanding data from the companys most
recent 10-K or 10-Q led prior to the closing date. Since many issuances are at frac-
tions close to the 20% threshold, I use CRSP shares outstanding to check for any
inconsistencies. To do this, I use two shares outstanding points from CRSP: shares
outstanding reported as of the day of the issuance contract date, and the following
shares outstanding change date. I subtract the number of shares issued from the
following change date to infer the share outstanding immediately before the issuance.
This helps identify errors in shares outstanding in case there was a share change be-
fore the issuance that was not appropriately recorded by CRSP. If the shareholder
approval categorization in terms of the 20% threshold does not agree with the catego-
rization calculated using PlacementTrackers shares outstanding, I drop the observa-
tion. PlacementTracker also records observations that achieve shareholder approval
before the issuance. I drop these observations if the fraction of equity issuance is less
than 20% but PlacementTracker indicates they have gained shareholder approval.
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